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The Western Sahara conflict was studied, given its long duration and 
threat to the security of both North and West Africa. Years of national 
liberation war by the Polisario Front, and the failure of the United 
Nations, since 1991, to conduct a referendum to determine the issue of 
independence for the Sahrawis have bred frustration, and presented 
the resumption of suspended hostilities, and terrorism as a viable 
solution to Africa’s last war of independence. By interrogating diverse 
sources on this subject through the application of contemporary 
historical method, this study exposes the challenge of this prolonged 
conflict to the credibility of the AU and the UNO, and the danger 
posed by the availability of idle Polisario fighters for recruitment 
by terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. It 
concludes that only the UN implementation of its resolutions on the 
matter since 1963 could avert a descent into terrorism.
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Introduction
The Western Sahara conflict remains unresolved over four decades after it 
attracted international attention, and over three decades after the Organization 
of African Unity (OAU), now the African Union’s (AU) involvement in 
the crisis. Thus, the Sahrawi struggle for self determination, the last to be 
inaugurated, has remained the last that may be difficult to be resolved, thus 
making the Western Sahara, Africa’s last colony. Given manifestations of 
contemporary terrorism represented by the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM) and the potentials of continued recruitment of disgruntled Sahrawis 
into the fold of AQIM, with dire consequences for not only North Africa, 
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but all countries bordering the sub-region, it is germane that the Polisario 
struggle be studied in its historical context. It is the expectation of this study 
to fully bare the causes, course and dynamics of international involvements 
in the conflict with a view to refocusing attention on the United Nations and 
AU principles which need to be invoked and enforced towards a fair and just 
settlement of this protracted and distorted struggle for self-determination, as 
embodied in appropriate UNO and AU resolutions dating back to the 1960’s. 
Our departure, which extant studies on the subject have not emphasized,1 is 
that both Morocco and Western Sahara were colonial territories one of which, 
Morocco has attained independence and should therefore not be allowed to 
pose a stumbling block to the attainment of the same goal by the remaining 
colony, Western Sahara.
The Colonial Origins of the Western Sahara Conflict
The conflict over Western Sahara, former Spanish Sahara could be traced back 
to the Berlin Conference of 1884/85 during which Western imperialist powers 
parcelled out African territories among themselves. The conference had 
shared out the Western Sahara to Spain thus, inaugurating the modern history 
of the Sahrawis. Before the territory was arbitrarily shared out to Spain, its 
people had a pre-colonial history of independent socio-political organization. 
The desert territory, known as Western Sahara shares common borders with 
Mauritania to the east, Algeria to the south, and Morocco to the north, with the 
Atlantic forming its limits to the west. The decision of the Berlin Conference 
to parcel the Western Sahara to Spain took into account, effective Spanish 
presence in the area before 1884. In the nineteenth century, Moroccan Kings 
had laid claims to Spanish territories in the region. For instance, in 1859 the 
Moroccan King, Sidi Mohammed IV had plunged his country into war with 
Spain over the Spanish fortification of Melilla. The Moroccan army was 
resoundingly defeated by Spanish troops who advanced menacingly on the 
heart of Morocco, which they could have occupied by military conquest but 
for British intervention. In a subsequent treaty of 1860, Morocco ceded more 
territories around Melilla to Spain, which had also won exclusive rights over 
Melilla. Morocco similarly undertook to indemnify Spain to the tune of four 
million pounds which was paid from Morocco’s customs receipts into Spanish 
coffers up to the 1880’s. In the same vein, Morocco signed a most-favoured-
nation agreement with Spain, forbidding her from granting trading privileges 
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to other European powers without extending similar privileges to Spain. In 
effect, Spanish territories in North Africa, including the Western Sahara rested 
on military conquest. Western Sahara was, therefore, a colonial territory like 
Morocco before the latter regained her independence from France in 19562.
The problem arose when Spain refused to decolonize peacefully. 
Spain was a backward country which was untouched by the ravages of the 
Second World War and, therefore, could afford to hold tightly to her colony 
in the era of decolonization. Having been shielded from the aftermath of the 
Second World War on account of her non-involvement, Spain suffered no loss 
of prestige, unlike Britain and France, for instance. She was thus under no 
immediate compulsion to negotiate or facilitate a peaceful transfer of power to 
the Sahrawis, whose earlier nationalist uprisings had been brutally suppressed 
by Spain in 1958. Under the Spanish policy of assimilation, there was no 
room for the expression of nationalist sentiments by subject peoples, and the 
Spanish state ruled out any possibility that its colonial subjects in Africa whose 
territories were reorganized as overseas extensions of Spain could ever become 
citizens of independent African states. By conferring the status of an overseas 
province on Western Sahara, Spain could argue that the former became 
equivalent to the metropolitan provinces. By this arrangement, the colonized 
Sahrawis, like their metropolitan counterparts, were, on paper, entitled to 
the same privileges and immunities, a strategy which Spanish authorities 
deployed to counter criticisms of their colonial policy in Africa in the wake of 
the movement towards decolonization. This strategy became effective in 1956 
when on the attainment of independence, Morocco immediately renewed with 
vigour, her claims not only to Western Sahara but also to Mauritania and parts 
of Mali and Algeria in furtherance of her dream of a ‘Greater Morocco’. In her 
renewed quest for territorial aggrandizement, Morocco sought to capitalize on 
a hostile world opinion against the anachronistic Spanish colonialism. When 
Mauritania attained independence in 1960, Morocco narrowed her attention 
to the Western Sahara, which is rich in phosphate deposits. The discovery and 
development of the mineral in the 1960’s however, further strengthened the 
resolve of Spain to cling on to the desert territory3.
The failure of Spain to decolonize peacefully could also be attributed to the 
character of the metropolitan government. Spain was ruled by a military 
dictatorship until 1975. The Spanish dictator, General Francisco Franco 
was at the head of an old-fashioned dictatorship, which closed all avenues 
to constitutional grant of independence through the grooming of a successor 
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African elite to which power would have been handed over as was done 
by France and Britain, which thereby controlled the pace of the movement 
towards independence in their colonies. Since she had failed to groom a 
successor-elite who could hold the forte and pander to her whims and caprices, 
Spain decided to mend fences with her former African rivals in a neo-colonial 
arrangement which would allow her access to the rich phosphate resources 
of the Western Sahara. This took the form of a Tripartite Agreement, which 
the dictator Francisco Franco, who died on 20 November 1975, signed, 
virtually on his death-bed on 14 November 1975 in Madrid, with Morocco 
and Mauritania. Spain undertook to transfer her administration of the Western 
Sahara and authority over the latter’s coastal waters to the two signatory 
powers. It has been observed that this “ambiguous ‘de-administration’ rather 
than an authentic decolonization”, 4 had the potential to provide the Sahrawis 
with an opportunity to express their attitude to self determination, probably 
through an internationally recognized referendum. More importantly, however, 
it guaranteed Spanish sovereignty over the territory, freed Madrid from the 
possibility of a direct military confrontation with Morocco, and provided 
Madrid with an elbow room to manoeuvre the contending signatory powers 
for control of the Western Sahara.
The Western Sahara Conflict as a War of National Liberation
The Sahrawis saw in the intrigues and agreement between the colonial power 
and the two signatory powers a window of opportunity to re-assert their claim 
over, and press for the independence of the Western Sahara from Spanish 
colonialism. On 10 May 1973, a small group of Sahrawi intellectuals had 
banded together to form the Frente Popular de Liberacion de Saguia el Hamra 
y Rio de Oro, or Polisario Front (The Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro). In the wake of the rapprochement between 
Spain and the signatory powers, the Polisario Front strengthened its resolve 
to wrest power from Spain and forcefully resist the arrangement embodied 
in the Tripartite Agreement, which had reflected Moroccan and Mauritanian 
opposition to Spain’s plan for an independent Western Sahara state after a 
referendum on self determination. In its resolve, the Polisario obviously drew 
inspiration from the fact that the Western Sahara remained a Spanish colony 
in spite of the fact that the United Nations (UN) had since 1963, listed it 
among territories to be decolonized in Africa. Besides, while Spain schemed to 
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manoeuvre itself out of the colony without losing face, Morocco had intensified 
its territorial claim and at its request the United Nations General Assembly in 
1974 referred the issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which, on 
October 12, 1975, declined to uphold Morocco’s claim of territorial integrity 
over the Western Sahara. By this ruling, the ICJ upheld the principle of self 
determination for the Sahrawis. Rather than accept the ruling of the world 
court, King Hassan II of Morocco organized a so-called ‘Green March’ on 
6 November 1975 in which 350,000 unarmed Moroccans occupied Western 
Sahara to assert Morocco’s claim over it. The Green March aroused the 
patriotic passions of Moroccans and signalled the beginning of military action 
on the Moroccan side, thereby boosting the waning popularity of the Moroccan 
monarch. The Mauritanians also expressed their rejection of the ICJ’s ruling 
and the Spanish intentions on the Western Sahara. Consequently, on November 
16, 1975, an overwhelmed Spain formally signified her intention to withdraw 
from the territory and to transfer the Western Sahara to a joint administration 
of Morocco and Mauritania5.
The Moroccan King, in effect sought to capitalize on the reassertion 
of Moroccan claim to the Western Sahara to stabilize his regime. Since he 
assumed power in 1961, King Hassan II, partly due to his despotic tendencies 
and partly to the general impoverishment of the population which was 
worsened by the effects of declining food production in the country, had had 
to contend with a stiff opposition. He maintained his firm grip on power by the 
brutality, including political assassination with which he silenced dissenting 
voices. Through this method, royal absolutism reduced “the political class 
into clients of the King…, and, from about 1971, into tied subsidiaries of a 
royal dictatorship”6. This notwithstanding, there was an attempt by the King’s 
janissaries to assassinate him in 1971. The vehemence with which he resisted 
any resolution of the Western Sahara issue in favour of self determination was 
obviously a self survival gambit which was aided by the failure of the colonial 
power to be decisive. The Spanish authority, weakened by a powerful domestic 
opposition which strongly questioned the wisdom of the official colonial 
policy on Western Sahara, could not risk war with the sabre-rattling Morocco 
and Mauritania, which like Spain were under dictatorships. On 26 February 
1976, Spain formally relinquished her administration of the Western Sahara to 
Morocco and Mauritania, thereby setting the stage for the launch of the war of 
national liberation by the Polisario Front.
The Madrid Agreement was a recipe for violence. The Polisario 
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Front, drawing inspiration from Algeria, which had gained independence in the 
aftermath of a fierce national liberation war against France, rejected Spain’s 
partition and handover of Western Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania. The 
Front, on 27 February 1976, proclaimed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic 
(SADR), and the launch of an armed struggle, the war of national liberation 
to wrest the independence of SADR from the colonial power and from the 
African signatory powers of Mauritania and Morocco between which it was 
purportedly partitioned. The Polisario Front also established new structures 
of the new state, designed to raise the political consciousness of the Sahrawis. 
To this end, Polisario congress adopted a new constitution laying down the 
revolutionary political orientation of the movement. The constitution set up 
the Command Council of the Revolution as the supreme body of the state, with 
a government and democratically elected National Council which enjoyed 
wide legislative powers.  At the lower tier were people’s committees in all 
camps (Wilayas), representatives of which attended area (daira) congresses. To 
defend the new sate was the Sahrawi People’s Liberation Army which was at 
the disposal of the Command Council of the Revolution to wage a concomitant 
fierce desert war7. To be sure, the Sahrawi rejection of their subject status was 
consonant with manifestations of the nationalism of subject peoples, who 
strive for political and cultural emancipation. Such nationalism describes the 
struggles of groups who, though constituting a majority in their territories find 
themselves in a position of minorities with respect to the state to which they 
belong. In their reaction, the Sahrawis thus rejected their status of inferiority, 
the denial of political and cultural self-expression to, and the imposition of 
alien rule and custom upon them. Simmons Symonolewicz posits that only 
such social movements striving for national liberation can be legitimately 
categorized as nationalist movements8.
The Sahrawi embrace of national liberation war was understandable. 
They were pricked by the treacherous manner in which Western Sahara was 
illegally shared out to local imperialists in Morocco and Mauritania, thereby 
thwarting their efforts at attaining independence. Excluded from the gains 
of a stalled independence, they had no option but to oil their weapons of 
war to reclaim their identity in a sovereign state of their own, and halt the 
mindless plundering of Sahrawi resources. By mending fences with Morocco 
and Mauritania, whose troops immediately occupied the territory on Spain’s 
withdrawal, the departing colonial power had hoped to continue to have access 
to the rich phosphate resources and fishes of the Western Sahara, in addition 
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to other benefits. Thus, in 1977, Morocco signed a fishing treaty with Spain 
which by 1981, would fetch Spanish fishermen a bounteous haul worth U.S.D 
$500. In complementary agreements expedited by the Tripartite Agreement, 
Spain further won concessions which guaranteed her a privileged position in 
the exploration and exploitation of phosphates in the Western Sahara’s Bou 
Craa complex. Spain reciprocated through the supply of arms to Morocco up to 
1977. The Polisario Front launched a fierce desert war which it combined with 
political pressures on the Spanish government that contended with a fierce 
opposition at home. This yielded positive results as Spanish opposition parties, 
called on the metropolitan government to repudiate the Tripartite Agreement 
of 1975. Polisario fighters further attacked Spanish fishing fleet, and kidnapped 
eight Spanish fishermen in 1978. The fishermen were released only after a 
communiqué at the end of its fourth congress in September 1978 signed by a 
representative of Spain’s ruling Union del Centro Democratic (UCD), Javier 
Ruperez, recognized the Polisario Front as the only legitimate representative 
of the Sahrawis. This action was a precursor to Spain’s repudiation, in 
September 1978, of her claims to Western Sahara, and request to the United 
Nations to intervene in the conflict with a view to upholding the rights of the 
Sahrawis to self-determination. Spain further supported the Sahrawi right to 
self-determination in 1980 as a basis for a political solution to the conflict9.
It has been suggested that the Polisario derived the impetus for 
its declaration of its national liberation war from Algeria, which since her 
independence in 1963 had competed with Morocco for regional supremacy. 
Born of a bloody, anti-colonial war, Algeria is said to have been incensed 
by Morocco’s treachery, and uncomfortable with the potential pre-eminence 
of a conservative monarchy in the region. She thus sought to fight a proxy 
war as it were with Morocco in the Western Sahara. Algeria’s promotion of 
a Canary Island Liberation Movement had further compounded matters for 
Spain. Algeria was no doubt instrumental to the military and diplomatic 
victories of SADR over Morocco by 198410. But it is important to note that 
the initial stimulus for SADR’s struggle for self-determination must be 
sought in the Sahrawi victory over Morocco at the ICJ, in 1975. Indeed, the 
evidence suggests that Algeria was supportive of, or at least condoned the 
Madrid Agreement. Her volte face came as a result of Morocco’s failure to 
ratify the Ifrane Treaty of 1969 between Morocco and Algeria which had been 
intended to resolve the border war between the two countries by demarcating 
their shared international boundary. Algeria, having ratified the treaty in May 
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1973, was suspicious that Morocco which reneged on her commitment to 
its ratification would renew her claims over the disputed territory once her 
possession of the Western Sahara was consummated. Moroccan acquisition 
of the Western Sahara had the potential to considerably increase her size and 
bring about her encirclement of Algeria, thereby denying the latter access to the 
Atlantic Ocean. Algerian support of the Polisario liberation war was, therefore, 
born out of her national economic and geopolitical self interest, including the 
preservation of “a stable equilibrium” which could uphold Algerian regional 
leadership that Moroccan acquisition of the Western Sahara could upset. It 
was not born out of her principled commitment to a path through which she 
had travelled to independence, but was compelled by initial Sahrawi military 
exertions which exposed Algeria’s “claims to Third World and revolutionary 
legitimacy” to a credibility crisis, if she “failed to defend the Sahrawis’ right 
to independence” 11.
The Polisario Front won more diplomatic victories through its 
recognition by the OAU. This recognition came at a time when Mauritania’s 
withdrawal from the conflict had weakened France’s meddlesomeness in the 
conflict. France, the spearhead of the renewed Western imperialist designs on 
Africa in the era of the Cold War12, impressed by the pro-Western policies of 
Morocco, had influenced the signing of the Tripartite Agreement, and sided with 
the ‘Greater Morocco’ project, thereby propping up Morocco’s intransigence 
on the Western Sahara, ostensibly to guard against the multiplication of micro 
states in Africa. No doubt, France, which approved of the cooperation on 
the conflict between Morocco and Mauritania, one of her neo-colonies, was 
further driven by the prospect of access to the rich phosphate resources of 
the Western Sahara, which would supplement her equally rich gains from her 
plundering of the iron ore resources of Mauritania. Obviously egged on by 
these considerations, France, for the ostensible reason that her nationals were 
attacked by Polisario nationalists, had intervened militarily against the Polisario 
Front from 2 December 1977 to 10 July 1978, when the pro-imperialist regime 
of Mokhtar Ould Daddah of Mauritania was overthrown in a military coup 
d’état. The successor military regime formally withdrew Mauritania from the 
conflict on 5 August 1979, due to the deleterious effects of the war on her 
fragile economy, leaving in the cold, France which succumbed to pressures 
from Algeria to recognize SADR13.
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OAU Membership for SADR and Recognition of Sahrawi Right to Self 
Determination through UN Supervised Referendum
It was in these circumstances that the OAU Summit of 1978, in its first 
concerted effort on the Western Sahara, belatedly set up a committee of so-
called “Five Wise Men”. Among other recommendations of the committee 
were an all-parties conference and the recognition of the right of the Sahrawis 
to self-determination. These recommendations opened the way for the 
recognition of the SADR by many African states such that in 1979, when the 
Monrovia Summit of the OAU endorsed the recommendations, SADR already 
enjoyed the recognition of 17 African states14. The Polisario, buoyed by this 
development and a string of military successes which exposed the Achilles’ 
heel of Morocco, sought to underplay Arab and Western support for Morocco 
by conducting a group of journalists on a 1000 kilometre drive through the 
northern sector of Western Sahara. This exercise showed that the nationalist 
body had not only taken the battle some one hundred kilometers into southern 
Morocco, but that indeed Moroccan troops were confined to a small triangle 
bounded by Hagounia, Smara and Boujdor. This stark reality probably moved 
Spain to recognize the need for the grant of independence to the Western 
Sahara. In the same vein, the Soviet Union, with her eyes more focused on the 
strategic position of Morocco and the rich phosphate resources of the Western 
Sahara, access to which could be more guaranteed by her support of Moroccan 
adventurism sympathized with the Sahrawis, while insisting that only a “UNO-
OAU supervised referendum” held the key to a resolution of the conflict15.
The OAU support of the Sahrawi right to self-determination, and the 
increasing support for the course of nationalism by Libya, South Yemen, Syria, 
Tunisia, and the countries of the Sahel region alongside Algeria did not end the 
conflict in favour of the Polisario. Rather, it exposed the duplicity of France 
and Spain, which in reality, encouraged Morocco, to inaugurate a new phase of 
the war in 1980 to effectively blunt the tip of the Polisario push for a decisive 
military victory. Morocco adopted the wall-building warfare strategy which 
involved the building in the disputed territory of a series of electronic warfare 
walls, complemented with tens of thousands of troops. The walls enclosed the 
so-called useful  triangle in the north west, comprising the phosphate mines 
at Bou Craa, the city of Smara, and the old Spanish colonial capital of El-
Ayoun. By 1985, the walls stretched from the Algerian-Moroccan border in the 
north to the city of Dakhla in the south, affording the Moroccan armed forces 
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the control of 2700- kilometre defence line. Its mounted radar and sensors 
facilitated detection of Polisario Front fighters by Moroccan troops, numbering 
about 120,000 by 1986. This colossal security belt left Morocco in physical 
control of at least 2/3 of the Western Sahara, including the urban settlements 
and the valuable phosphate mines but at a cost of U.S.D $1,000 million per 
annum. 
The Polisario gained more international support in the face of 
Moroccan intransigence. By 1987, 70 countries from Africa, Latin America, 
Oceania, Asia, and one European country had recognized the SADR. This 
was after the OAU had at its November 1984 Addis Ababa Summit taken 
the unprecedented decision to admit the SADR as a full-member state, with 
its president, Mohammed Abdelaziz elected as one of OAU’S eight vice-
presidents. OAU’s action was subsequently endorsed by the Non-Aligned 
Movement’s foreign ministers’ conference held in Luanda in September 
1985. This was followed in December 1985, with a UN General Assembly 
resolution ratified at the world body by 92 votes to seven, with 39 abstentions. 
The resolution was an endorsement of an earlier OAU resolution AHG 104, 
which had called on Morocco and the Polisario to engage in direct negotiations 
aimed at achieving a ceasefire and creating conditions for a peaceful and 
fair referendum, under the auspices of the OAU and the UNO, without any 
administrative or military encumbrances16.
Yet, Morocco remained defiant, and in fact withdrew her membership 
of the OAU. Moroccan intransigence is accounted for by the backing which 
she enjoyed from the United States of America. American support for Morocco 
was hinged on the former’s Cold War strategic considerations. Morocco is 
strategically located astride the Mediterranean Sea’s entrance in northwest 
Africa, and provided transit facilities for the U.S rapid deployment force at 
her airbases. Morocco was further supported by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
with the funding of her arms purchases. The two conservative monarchies 
were U.S pawns in the Cold War diplomatic chessboard of the Mediterranean 
and the Persian Gulf. Indeed, Basil Davison’s analysis of the root source and 
driving force of contemporary Africa’s crises in 1987 applies with much force 
to the Western Sahara conflict, namely the Cold War exercised “a conditioning 
effect which has greatly distracted the course of African history in these thirty 
years, and hugely conflicted the difficulties, in any case large, of the struggles 
for post-colonial change and reconstruction”17.
In 1989, however, the rise to power in the Soviet Union of Mikhail 
Article: Emmanuel Nwafor Mordi
 
Jebat  Volume 42 (1) (July 2015) Page | 10
Gorbachev tended to sweep Cold War calculations to the dustbin of history. 
Through his twin reform policy of Perestroika and Glasnost, designed to create 
a more open and competitive Russian society, it became clear that combatants 
hinging sustenance of their struggle on Cold War calculations would have to 
learn to be self-sustaining. The result was a dramatic abhorrence of conflicts, 
and drive towards peaceful resolutions of conflict on a global scale. Osofisan 
has documented the far-reaching impact of the Gorbachev ascendancy on the 
outbreak of peace globally:
…recently, the epidemic which seemed to have broken out, and was 
spreading everywhere, was something called peace. 
…this outbreak of peace was a fall out from Gorbachev’s Glasnost and 
Perestroika, the Russian man’s campaign both for a more open and 
more competitive (acquisitive?) society, and for a world of reduced 
ideological tensions.
… And the result is that other antagonisms, especially those fuelled by 
these ideological ideas, lose their sense and sustenance18.
 
Lamine Bali, a Polisario representative acknowledged the impact of these 
reforms on the nationalist body’s sudden meeting with king Hassan of 
Morocco, when he spoke to West Africa: 
After fourteen years of war, it is time for a political settlement. It is 
clear to all that a military solution is not a real solution to the conflict. 
Also, the meeting has come in a period of détente, meetings between 
the Soviet Union and the U.S, settlement of a number of conflicts. 
On the regional level, there is reconciliation between Tunisia and 
Libya, between Morocco and Algeria, and there is no reason why 
there should not be reconciliation between the SADR and Morocco19.
The failure of OAU – UN referendum, and the dilemma of terrorism in 
the Western Sahara
Any hope of a speedy resolution of the conflict foreboded by the effect of the 
Gorbachev reforms floundered on the uncompromising attitudes of Morocco 
and Algeria. Morocco refused to recognize the Sahrawi struggle as a national 
liberation war and insisted, instead, that it was a proxy war being waged against 
her by Algeria, which could therefore only be resolved by the two nations. The 
meeting between King Hassan of Morocco and the Polisario was held after 
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Morocco had rejected Polisario overtures for such a rapprochement. It would 
appear that King Hassan II agreed to the meeting not necessarily due to the 
effects brought on by the end of the Cold War, but primarily due to his belief that 
the Polisario Front leadership was too splintered and weakened by defections 
to Morocco to be able to sustain the war. The meeting, however, facilitated 
the UN negotiation of a ceasefire between the warring parties which became 
effective in 1991, and heightened expectations that the much awaited OAU-
UN referendum would be conducted without delay. When representatives of 
Morocco and the Western Sahara met in Geneva in June 1990, the issue of 
those eligible to participate in the referendum was settled, namely the 73,497 
Sahrawis based on the 1974 census, who would choose either independence 
for the Western Sahara, or her integration with Morocco20. This seemed to be 
an improvement on the 1981situation. In that year, a UN-OAU committee 
had recommended a fair and impartial referendum to provide the indigenous 
Sahrawis with an opportunity to freely and democratically determine the 
future of their territory. King Hassan of Morocco had disagreed with the 
OAU suggestion that the referendum be open to all Sahrawis, including those 
Saharan refugees who were outside the SADR territory. Instead, Morocco had 
insisted that the referendum be restricted not only to the 73,497 Sahrawis on 
the basis of the 1974 census but should also be controlled by her21.
 The Settlement Plan embodied the OAU-UNO referendum, which 
the UN Security Council in Resolution 690 of 29 April 1991, approved. 
The Plan envisaged a ceasefire, and a ‘transitional period’ culminating in a 
referendum. It was expected that the ‘transitional period’ which would cover 
the period from the commencement of ceasefire to the proclamation of the 
result of the referendum would not exceed 20-26 weeks. The United Nations 
Security Council in its Resolution 690 also established the UN Mission for 
the Organization of a Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO), which 
would serve as a peacekeeping mission22. The ceasefire became effective as 
from September 6, 1991, but the referendum could not hold as scheduled 
due to a number of reasons. Added to delays in the exchange of prisoners 
between Polisario and Morocco, and the repatriation of the Sahrawi refugees 
from outside SADR territory was a major confusion about the issue of voter 
eligibility for the referendum. Above all, Johannes Manz of Switzerland, who 
was the UN Special Envoy, charged with the leadership of MINURSO and 
the conduct of the referendum, resigned his appointment, compelling the 
UN Secretary General, Perez de Cueller to propose the postponement of the 
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referendum to the Security Council. 
The main issue was the confusion over the eligibility criteria, which 
both parties argued were changed by the UN Secretary General, who had 
insisted that voting rights be extended to all Sahrawis not captured by the 
1974 census because it would be unfair to deny those who fled their country 
from colonial domination the right to decide the future of the country which 
they belonged to23. His insistence was based on the mandate bestowed on an 
Identification Commission created by the plan to create a voters list which 
would incorporate all Western Saharans of 18 years and above captured in the 
1974 census, whether they were resident in the territory or out of it as refugees. 
The commission was further mandated to update the 1974 census by deleting 
the names of all those who had since died, and considering applications from 
Sahrawis whose names were omitted from the 1974 census. 
The attempt to solve the problem through the appointment of James 
Baker III, in 1997 as the UN Secretary General’s Personal Envoy for Western 
Sahara ran into similar hitches, such that in 2003 Morocco completely 
withdrew from the referendum process over the Identification Commission’s 
denial of eligibility status to a majority of prospective voters submitted by 
her. Only 86,426 of all 250,000 applicants were considered to be “eligible 
voters” by the commission. James Baker, to win back Morocco to the process, 
proposed a Framework Agreement recognizing her as the ‘Administering 
Power’ in the Western Sahara, while  devolving some powers of governance 
to the ‘inhabitants’ of the territory for five years, before the referendum could 
be held. In effect, Baker introduced a strange element into the Settlement Plan, 
namely the eligibility of non-Sahrawis to vote in the referendum, which would 
include the issue of autonomy within the State of Morocco for Sahrawis. The 
Polisario rejected the Framework Agreement, which the Secretary General had 
accepted. Thus Baker proposed his ‘Peace Plan’ which provided for a third 
option of a semi-autonomous Western Sahara that would govern over a five 
year transition period, a new voter eligibility based on (1) a voters list to be 
published by MINURSO, or (2) a UNCHR repatriation list for the period up to 
October 31, 2000, or (3) all those who had resided continuously in the territory 
for an agreed period up to the date of the provisional voters list, December 30, 
1999. 
The UN Security Council and the Polisario accepted the Peace 
Plan, but it was totally rejected by Morocco which ruled out any option of 
independence for the SADR, even if all applicants previously rejected by 
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the Identification Commission were included. In April 2007, she proposed, 
instead to integrate Western Sahara as an ‘autonomous region’ into Morocco 
whose unity and sovereignty would be preserved under the Moroccan 
Initiative for Negotiating an Autonomy Statute for the Sahara Region. The 
Polisario, suspicious of Moroccan claim that her statute guaranteed Sahrawis 
an opportunity to choose independence from, or integration into Morocco, 
published an alternative plan, which reaffirmed their commitment to self-
determination through a UN monitored referendum24. The UN Security Council 
reacted to these presentations through the issuance of Resolution 1754, which 
called on the parties to engage in direct negotiations without preconditions 
so as to   guarantee a Political Solution that would be mutually acceptable 
and provide for self-determination for the Sahrawis. To implement the new 
Initiative was a new UN Secretary General’s Personal Envoy, Peter van 
Walsum of the Netherlands, who met severally with representatives of both 
parties in Manhasset, Long Island in the U.S.A. in 2007. Within a year of the 
new initiative the new Personal Envoy was relieved of his post on the basis 
of Polisario criticism of his pro-Morocco sympathies. He had claimed that an 
independent Western Sahara was no longer a viable option because it was not 
a realizable objective25.
It is important to stress, however, that Resolution 1754 was flawed 
ab initio and therefore unworkable. Not only did it fail to define its concept 
of ‘negotiations without pre-conditions’, as well as its expectations from such 
negotiations, but it had further compounded issues by expecting a mutually 
acceptable political solution from Morocco and the Polisario Front. Morocco 
was rigid about her claim of sovereignty over the Western Sahara, while 
the Polisario was committed to the independence of the territory, an option 
which Morocco considered an affront on her territorial integrity. The Security 
Council yet continued to insist on a mutually acceptable political solution, 
even while admitting that it lacked the wherewithal to enforce any outcome of 
its proposed referendum. Consequently, by “linking self-determination with 
independence, while no action is taken to make it happen”, the United Nations 
Security Council “has only contributed to the irresolution of the conflict”26 
Morocco frustrated any scheme which upheld referendum in the 
Western Sahara as a way of resolving the conflict, even when a new Special 
Envoy, Christopher Ross mounted the saddle in 2008, and in spite of the UN 
Security Council Resolution 1871.  Moroccan attitude which the UN Envoys 
to Western Sahara seemed to have accepted was responsible for the failure, yet 
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persistence of UN intervention in the Western Sahara crisis. As articulated by 
James Baker (quoted in Sola-Martin):
This is a really low intensity, low level dispute. Look, there’s no action 
forcing event on the Western Sahara conflict. Morocco has won the 
war. She’s in possession. Why should she agree to anything? And 
so she is disinclined to do so. Well, there’s one very good reason 
why she should, because she will never receive the imprimatur of 
international legitimacy for her occupation of the territory unless 
she works out some arrangement that is blessed in the international 
community, blessed by the Security Council, or acceptable to the 
other party. That’s why we work so very hard on the idea of an initial 
autonomy arrangement with self-government and then a referendum 
at the end of the test, the requirement of the Security Council for self-
determination27.
When the United Nations assumed responsibility over the Western 
Sahara, it was guided by the principle of self-determination as enshrined in 
Chapter XI of its Charter on Non-Self Governing Territories which tasks 
colonial powers on the development of the self government of such territories, 
taking into account their political aspirations. In 1960, the principle was made 
explicit through the General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) which relates 
to the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, namely 
that all peoples not only have the right to self-determination, but are entitled 
to freely determine their political status, including the freedom to pursue 
their economic, social and political development. By Resolutions 1514 and 
1541, the General Assembly extended such rights to groups with distinct 
geography, culture or ethnicity vis-à-vis those of the colonial power but “yet 
are subordinate to another state”. Thus the United Nations related the right 
to self-determination to ‘the right to decolonization and attainment of self-
government’ for non-self governing peoples through “a process that takes 
into account the freely expressed will of the people”. Despite the Tripartite 
Agreement of 1975, therefore, Western Sahara, since 1963, had remained 
on the UN’s list of Non-Self Governing Territories, and consistently been 
so recognized by the appropriate organs of the United Nations, members of 
the Security Council, as well as the General Assembly and the African Union 
in various AU Resolutions. On the contrary, neither the UN, nor any state in 
the world has recognized Morocco’s assertion of sovereignty over Western 
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Sahara28.
The principle of self-determination governs all matters of 
decolonization – the affected peoples freely decide where they want to belong via 
a referendum organized by the United Nations. This explains why referendum, 
self-determination and independence continued to feature in UN Resolutions, 
or other proposals on the conflict. It also accounts for the Polisario rejection of 
any proposals which sought to abridge their right to self-determination., and the 
failure of the international community to accept Morocco’s offer of unilateral 
integration of the Sahrawis into Moroccan territory. It equally explains why not 
even the UN can impose its decision on the matter. But it fails to explain why 
the issue remains stalemated. The evidence suggests that interests extraneous 
to the conflict were responsible for its prolongation. For instance, the United 
States of America, which had maintained a neutral position on the conflict had 
by 2004, implemented a policy shift in support of Morocco. In that year, the 
U.S., Spain and France supported Morocco’s proposal of integration of the 
Western Sahara as part of her Saharan provinces. In this policy shift, it would 
appear that the overriding consideration was Morocco’s cooperation with 
the United States in her anti-terrorism war in Northwest Africa. The United 
States would not support any settlement that would destabilize the Moroccan 
monarchy, given America’s premium on her relationship with Morocco not 
only as a principal partner and major ally in the antiterrorism war, but also as a 
valued power player in her policy on the Middle East, and democratic reform 
agenda in the Arab world. Conversely, Algeria, in her support of the Polisario, 
was comfortable with the relative isolation of Morocco over the crisis, which 
helped to thwart the latter’s regional ascendancy ambitions. The Polisario later 
enjoyed the support of Cuba, Venezuela, South Africa, as well as widespread 
support in Spain, and among some parliamentarians in Europe and the United 
States29, for the principles of the United Nations on decolonization, or out of 
lingering scores they had to settle with the United States.
The lack of concrete progress in the United Nations intervention in 
the Sahrawi conflict meant that the Western Sahara became a millstone for 
the world body, as the Non-Self-Governing Territory remained the last colony 
that may never be decolonized, a major symbol of failure, and dent on an 
otherwise proud history of support for decolonization. It is this grim possibility 
that had heightened frustration, tension, feeling of disappointment, betrayal 
and abandonment, and presented terrorism as a viable alternative to an elusive 
referendum. So palpable was this anxiety that the Polisario leadership tended 
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to accept the reality that “the long period of waiting, the disappointments, as 
well as some ideas having currency in the Maghreb may somewhat influence…
young Sahrawis…who are interested in radical Islamism”. This group began 
to accept violence as the surest way for the Sahrawi realization of their 
movement towards independent statehood. The ascendancy of such extremist 
views seemed an imminent possibility, given that after the signing of the 1991 
ceasefire agreement, many Polisario fighters withdrew into Mauritania, just 
as other young groups with highly impressionistic minds went into Algeria, 
and in both cases were exposed to violent tendencies of the Islamist extremist 
orientation. This strand became attractive and strove to fill the vacuum created 
by the end of the Cold War which had discredited the pseudo-Marxist orientation 
of the Polisario leadership, and made renewed armed struggle underpinned by 
an Islamist ideology a credible strategy to end the conflict. There was evidence 
which suggested that there were Polisario links in the widespread incidences 
of kidnapping of Westerners by Al-Qaeda in the Islamist Maghreb (AQIM) 
in Niger, Mali, Tunisia, Mauritania-Mali border, Polisario administered 
refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria, which were populated by frustrated and 
idle Polisario fighters who had taken to militancy, criminality and banditry, as 
well as  AQIM’s sustained armed attempts to dismember Mali between 2011 
and 2013, when the mandate of the MINURSO was expected to expire. It was 
against this background that the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon in April 
2013, advocated the urgent resolution of the Sahrawi conflict “as part of a 
broader strategy for the Sahel”, given “the rise of instability and insecurity in 
and around the Sahel…”30.
Conclusion
The Western Sahara conflict, by 2013 had remained unresolved, even though the 
Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) was a member state of the African 
Union, unlike Morocco which suspended her membership of the continental 
body by 1984. As it were, the African Union which at the Cairo Summit of 
1964 had resolved to respect and maintain the boundaries laid down by the 
former colonial powers and to recognize same as the unalterable boundaries of 
the respective African states on their attainment of independence, lacked the 
political will and wherewithal to ensure Morocco’s acceptance of this tangible 
reality, which she had rejected at the Cairo Summit31. Thus, a non-member 
state of the African Union for about three decades held the African continent to 
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ransom and single handedly posed a stumbling block to the Sahrawi attainment 
of independent statehood. The United Nations could not break the impasse 
even though the Western Sahara had featured since 1963 on its list of Non-
Self-Governing Territories, and in spite of the numerous resolutions and 
measures adopted by the Security Council to comply with the UN Charter 
and facilitate the attainment of independence by the Sahrawi through a UN 
organized referendum, the framework of which the world body had established 
in 1991. A referendum which it had scheduled to organize in January 1992, to 
pave way for the independence of the Western Sahara still remained a thorny 
issue by 2013, in spite of the presence of MINURSO. In effect, it could be 
said that all avenues for the peaceful resolution of the conflict had been fully 
stretched with no tangible result, thereby leading to frustration, anger, loss 
of confidence in both the UN and AU, and making resumed armed struggle 
through every available means, including terrorism which by 2013 was readily 
provided by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a viable alternative. 
The United Nations should, therefore, shake-off all encumbrances militating 
against its compliance with its own principles of self-determination through 
referendum for all Non-Self-Governing Territories and bring lasting peace 
through independence to the occupied Western Sahara.
Acknowledgement
This is a revised version of Paper Presented at the Faculty of Arts 2014 
International Conference on The Humanities and Africa’s Contemporary 
Challenges, Held  at the Delta State University, Abraka, Nigeria, 23rd – 
26th September 2014.
Endnotes
1. For instance, see S. Baynham, The war in Western Sahara, Africa 
 Insight, 21(1) 1991: 48-56.
2. E. A. Ayandele, The Magrib in the nineteenth century, in J. C. Anene  
 & G. N. Brown eds., Africa in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
 Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1966:188. 
3. Baynham, 49.
4. P. C. Naylor, Spain and France and the decolonization of the Western 
 Sahara: Parity and paradox, 1975-87, Africa Today, 34 (3) Third 
Article: Emmanuel Nwafor Mordi
 
Jebat  Volume 42 (1) (July 2015) Page | 18
 Quarter 1987: 7-16.
5. A. Arieff, 2013, Western Sahara: Congressional Research Service 
 Report for Congress, 14 April Available at http://www.cts.gov, 
 [Accessed on 21 August 2014].
6. Y. Zoubair, Soviet policy towards the Western Sahara conflict, 
 Africa Today, 34 (3) Third Quarter 1987: 17.
7. Naylor, 8-9.
8. K. Simmons – Symonolewicz, Nationalist movements: An attempt at 
 a comparative typology, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 
 (7) 1964-65: 24-30.
9. Naylor, 8.
10. Arieff
11. M. J. Willis, Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and 
 Morocco from independence to the Arab spring, London: C. Hurst & 
 co [publishers], 2012: 112, 274-75.
12. T. A. Imobighe, African states and defence agreement with foreign
 powers: The negation of non-alignment, Nigerian Journal of 
 International Affairs, vol 7 no 182, 1981: 79-95.
13. Naylor, 10-11.
14. S. E.Orabator, Irredentism as pretext: The Western Sahara case, 
 1960-1982, Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, 10(1&2), 
 December1981-June 1982: 75
15. Zoubair, 28
16. T. Hodges, Western Sahara: The second decade of war. Africa 
 Report, 31 (2), March-April 1986: 76-81.
17. B. Davidson, Thirty years of liberation struggle. Africa Today, 34 (4) 
 4th Quarter 1987: 5-16.
18. F. Osofisan, The unremembered reconciliations, Sunday Times, 13 
 August 1989: 5.
19. L. Bali, Interview. West Africa, (3731) 20-26 February 1989: 268.
20. M. J. Willis, Politics and power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and 
 Morocco from independence to the Arab spring, London: C. Hurst & 
 co [publishers], 2012: 187.
21. Orabator, 177-78
22. New York City Bar Association, The legal issues involved in the 
 Western Sahara dispute: The principle of self-determination and the 
 legal claims of Morocco, New York: Committee on the United 
The Dilemma of National Liberation War, Referendum and Terrorism In Africa’s Last Colony, 1973 – 2013
Jebat  Volume 42 (1) (July 2015) Page | 19
 Nations, June, 2012: 15-16.
23. C. Simpson, Morocco-Polisario relations hits a new low: Saharan 
 setbacks, West Africa, 13-19 January 1992: 70.
24. A. Sola-Martin, Conflict resolution in Western Sahara, African 
 Journal on Conflict Resolution, 9 (3) 2009: 130-33.
25. ESISC, The Polisraio Front: A destabilizing force in the region 
 that is active, October 2008: 12 Available at http://www.esisc.org 
 [Accessed on 21 August 2014].
26. A. Theofilopoulous, Western Sahara: The failure of ‘negotiations 
 without preconditions’. Peace Brief 22: United States Institute of 
 Peace, April 23, 2010: 1-4 Available at http://www.usip.org
 [Accessed on 19 August 2014].
27. A. Sola-Martin, Conflict resolution in Western Sahara.  African 
 Journal on Conflict Resolution, 9 (3), 2009: 121.
28. New York City Bar Association, June 2012: 73-78.
29. Arief, 6.
30. Ibid, 9. 
31. E. Jouve, Africa and its border problems. In UNESCO, The 
 methodology of contemporary African history: Reports and  papers 
 of the meeting of experts organized by UNESCO at Ouagadougou, 
 Upper Volta, from 17 to 22 May 1979, Paris: The United Nations 
 Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1984: 141. 
References
Arieff, A. 2013 14 April. Western Sahara: Congressional Research Service 
Report for Congress. Retrieved from http://www.cts.gov.  
Ayandele, E. A. 1966. The Magrib in the nineteenth century. In, Africa in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, eds., Anene J. C. & Brown  G. N. 
Ibadan: Ibadan University Press.
Bali, L. 1989, 20-26 February. Interview. West Africa, (3731): 268.
Baynham, S. 1991. “The War in Western Sahara”. Africa Insight, 
21(1): 48-56.
Boukhars, A. 2012. Simmering Discontent in the Western Sahara. 
Washington D. C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Davidson, B. 1987. “Thirty Years of Liberation Struggle”. Africa Today, 34(4, 
4th Quarter): 5-16.
ESISC.  2008, October. The Polisraio Front: A Destabilizing Force in the 
Region that is Active. Retrieved from http://www.esisc.org. 
Article: Emmanuel Nwafor Mordi
 
Jebat  Volume 42 (1) (July 2015) Page | 20
ESISC. 2010. The Polisario Front and the Development of Terrorism in the 
Sahel. Retrieved from http://www.esisc.org.  
Hodges, T. 1986. “Western Sahara: The Second Decade of War”. Africa 
Report,31 (March-April): 76-81.
Imobighe, T. A, 1981. “African States and Defense Agreement with Foreign 
Powers: The Negation of Non-Alignment”. Nigerian Journal of 
International Affairs, 7(182): 79-95.
Jouve, E.1984. “Africa and its border problems”. In UNESCO, The 
methodology of contemporary African history: Reports and papers 
of the meeting of experts organized by UNESCO at Ouagadougou, 
Upper Volta, from 17 to 22 May 1979: 137-47. Paris: The United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.
 Naylor, P. C. 1987. “Spain and France and the decolonization of the Western 
Sahara: Parity and Paradox, 1975-87”. Africa Today. 34(3): 7-16
New York City Bar Association, 2012, June. The legal issues involved in the 
Western Sahara dispute: The principle of self-determination and 
the legal claims of Morocco. New York: Committee on the United 
Nations.
Orabator, S. E. 1981/82 December-June. “Irredentism as pretext: The Western 
Sahara case, 1960-1982”. Journal of the Historical Society of 
Nigeria, 10(1&2): 166-81.
Simmons – Symonolewicz, K. 1964-65. “Nationalist movements: An attempt 
at a comparative typology”. Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, 7: 24-30.
Simpson, C. 1992. “Morocco-Polisario relations hit a new low: Saharan 
setbacks”. West Africa: 70, 13-19 January.
Sola-Martin, A. 2009.  “Conflict resolution in Western Sahara”.  African 
Journal on Conflict Resolution, 9(3): 117-40.
 Theofilopoulous, A. 2010, April 23. Western Sahara: The failure of 
‘negotiations without preconditions’. Peace Brief 22: United States 
Institute of Peace. Retrieved from http://www.usip.org.  
Willis, M. J. 2012. Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and 
Morocco from independence to the Arab spring, London: C. Hurst & 
co [publishers]
Zoubair, Y. 1987. “Soviet Policy Towards the Western Sahara Conflict”. Africa 
Today, 34(3): 17-32
The Dilemma of National Liberation War, Referendum and Terrorism In Africa’s Last Colony, 1973 – 2013
Jebat  Volume 42 (1) (July 2015) Page | 21
Biographical note
Dr. E. N. Mordi (emmanumordi@yahoo.com), B.A (Hons), Nigeria; M.A, 
Ibadan; PhD, Nigeria; Contact phone: 08036761418; studied History both at 
the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, and the University of Ibadan, in Nigeria, and 
has taught History to Undergraduate and Graduate students for many years. He 
has contributed researched articles to national and foreign journals on various 
aspects of contemporary Nigerian history. In addition to chapters in books, 
he has authored and co-edited tertiary level textbooks. He has also presented 
papers in national and international conferences as well as in workshops, 
seminars, etc. He is a Senior Lecturer in History, in the Department of History 
and International Studies, Delta State University, Abraka, Nigeria, of which 
he was the Acting Head of Department between 2004/2005 and 2008/2009 
Academic Sessions.
Article: Emmanuel Nwafor Mordi
 
Jebat  Volume 42 (1) (July 2015) Page | 22
